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WHAT IS NEXT FOR THE OROMO PEOPLE?1 
Asafa Jalata, PhD, 
Professors of Sociology and Global Studies, and Interim Chair of the Africana Studies Program 
at the University of Tennessee – Knoxville 
 
Thank you for inviting me to give a talk on the future of the Oromo people. To try to speculate 
on the future of the Oromo people is a very challenging task. Nevertheless, I try my best 
depending on my knowledge of the Oromo colonial history and national struggle in relation to 
the Ethiopian colonial state. Currently, the Oromo people and their national struggle are at a 
crossroads because of three major reasons. First, since the Oromo people are engaged in national 
struggle for self-determination, statehood, sovereignty, and democracy, the Tigrayan-led 
Ethiopian government is systematically attacking and terrorizing them. Second, at the same time, 
the Oromo elites who suppose to provide guidance and leadership for the Oromo national 
movement are fragmented, ideologically confused, and have failed to understand the lethal 
danger the Oromo people are facing from the Habasha colonizing elites. Third, the Oromo 
people are suffering from absolute poverty, recurrent famines, and malnutrition because the 
Meles regime and its supporters loot their economic resources. 
 In addressing these three complex problems, I focus on five central issues. First, I explore 
the past and current status of the Oromo nation under Ethiopian colonialism. Second, I identity 
and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the Oromo elites in organizing and leading the 
Oromo national movement. Third, I explain the main characteristics of Oromo society. Fourth, I 
briefly identify the major opportunities and obstacles of the Oromo struggle. Finally, I suggest 
some urgent and practical measures that the Oromo elites and society should take to ensure the 
survival Oromia and to achieve national victory. 
The Past and Current Status of the Oromo People 
The Ethiopian colonial terrorism and genocide that started during the last decades of the 19th 
century still continue in the 21st century. Ethiopia, former Abyssinia, terrorized and committed 
genocide on the Oromo people during the Scramble for Africa with the help of European 
imperial powers and the modern weapons they received from them.2 During Ethiopian colonial 
expansion, Oromia, “the charming Oromo land, [would] be ploughed by the iron and the fire; 
flooded with blood and the orgy of pillage.”3 Calling this event as “the theatre of a great 
massacre,” Martial De Salviac states,  
 
The conduct of Abyssinian armies invading a land is simply barbaric. They contrive a sudden irruption, 
more often at night. At daybreak, the fire begins; surprised men in the huts or in the fields are three quarter 
massacred and horribly mutilated; the women and the children and many men are reduced to captivity; the 
soldiers lead the frightened herds toward the camp, take away the grain and the flour which they load on 
the shoulders of their prisoners spurred on by blows of the whip, destroy the harvest, then, glutted with 
                                                     
1The Oromo-American Citizens Council, the Fourth Annual International Conference on Human Rights, March 13, 2009, The 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.   	  
2 Bonnie Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, The Invention of Ethiopia, (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1990); Asafa Jalata, Oromia & 
Ethiopia, (Denver: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993). 
3	  Martial	  De Salviac, An Ancient People, Great African Nation, trans by Ayalew Kano (East Lansing, Michigan, 2005, [1901]), p. 
349.	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booty and intoxicated with blood, go to walk a bit further from the devastation. That is what they call 
‘civilizing a land.’4 
  
The Oromo oral story also testifies that Ethiopians/Abyssinians destroyed and looted the 
resources of Oromia, and committed genocide on the Oromo people through massacre, slavery, 
depopulation, cutting hands, famine, and diseases during and after the colonization of Oromia. 
Recognizing this tragedy, “the Oromo said: ‘It is Waaqa [God] … who has subjected us to the 
Amhara.’”5 According to Martial De Salviac, “With equal arms, the Abyssinia [would] never 
[conquer] an inch of land. With the power of firearms imported from Europe, Menelik 
[Abyssinian warlord] began a murderous revenge.”6 The colonization of Oromia involved human 
tragedy and destruction: “The Abyssinian, in bloody raids, operated by surprise, mowed down 
without pity, in the country of the Oromo population, a mournful harvest of slaves for which the 
Muslims were thirsty and whom they bought at very high price. An Oromo child [boy] would 
cost up to 800 francs in Cairo; an Oromo girl would well be worth two thousand francs in 
Constantinople”7  
 The Ethiopian government massacred half of the Oromo population (five million out of 
ten million) and their leadership during its colonial expansion. 8  According to Alexander 
Bulatovich (2000: 68-69), “The dreadful annihilation of more than half of the population during 
the conquest took away from the Gallas [Oromos] all possibilities of thinking about any sort of 
uprising. . . .  Without a doubt, the Galla, with their least five million population, occupying the 
best land, all speaking one language, could represent a tremendous force if united.” The 
destruction of Oromo lives, institutions, and Oromian natural beauty were aspects of Ethiopian 
colonial terrorism. The surviving Oromos who used to enjoy an egalitarian democracy known as 
the gada system9 were forced to face state terrorism, political repression, and an impoverished 
life. Bulatovich explains about the gada administration and notes that “the peaceful free way of 
life, which could have become the ideal for philosophers and writers of the eighteenth century, if 
they had known it, was completely changed. Their peaceful way of life is broken; freedom is 
lost; and the independent, freedom loving Gallas find themselves under the severe authority of 
the Abyssinian conquerors.”10  
 Ethiopian colonialists also destroyed Oromo natural resources and the beauty of Oromia. 
Oromia was “an oasis luxuriant with large trees” and known for its “opulent and dark greenery 
used to shoot up from the soil.”11 De Salviac also notes that “the greenery and the shade delight 
the eyes all over and give the landscape richness and a variety which make it like a garden 
without boundary. Healthful climate, uniform and temperate, fertility of the soil, beauty of the 
inhabitants, the security in which their houses seem to be situated, makes one dream of 
remaining in such a beautiful country.”12 The Abyssinian colonialists devastated “the forests by 
                                                     
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, P. 350. 
6 Ibid, p. 8. 
7 Ibid, p. 28. 
8 De Salviac, ibid, pp. 6-8, 278; Alexander Bulatovich, Ethiopia through Russian Eyes: Country in Transition, translated by 
Richard Seltzer, (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2000), pp. 68-68. 
9See Asmarom Largesse, Oromo Democracy, (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 2000). The gada system had the principles of 
checks and balances, balanced opposition, and power sharing between higher and lowers administrative organs to prevent power 
falling into the hands of despots. Other principles included balanced representation of clans, lineages, regions, and confederacies; 
accountability of leaders; the settlement of disputes through reconciliation; and respect for basic rights and liberties. 
10 Alexander Bulatovich, ibid, p. 68. 
11 De Salviac, ibid, pp. 21-22. 
12 De Salviac, ibid, p. 21. 
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pulling from it the laths for their houses and [made] campfires or firewood for their dwellings. . . 
. [They were] the great destructors of trees, others [accused] them of exercising their barbarity 
against the forests for the sole pleasure of ravaging.”13 Bulatovich applied to Oromia the phrase 
“flowing in milk and honey”14 to indicate its abundant wealth in cattle and honey. 
 The Ethiopian colonial state gradually established settler colonialism in Oromia and 
developed five major types of colonial institutions, namely, slavery, the colonial landholding 
system, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery), the Oromo collaborative class, and garrison 
and non-garrison cities. It introduced the process of forced recruitment of labor via slavery and 
the nafxanya-gabbar (semi-slavery) system.15 The colonial state expropriated almost all Oromo 
lands and divided up the Oromo among colonial officials and soldiers and their collaborators to 
force them to produce agricultural commodities and food for local consumption and an 
international market. The Oromo farmers were reduced to serfs or slaves or semi-slaves and 
coerced to work without remuneration for the settlers, intermediaries, and the colonial state for 
certain days every week. Whenever they failed to provide free labor or pay taxes or tributes, the 
settlers enslaved their children or wives.   
The colonial terrorism that started during the reign of Menelik has continued under 
successive Ethiopian governments. The Haile Selassie government continued the policies of 
Menelik until it was overthrown by the popular revolt of 1974. The Selassie government 
terrorized the Oromo of Raya-Azabo, Wallo, Hararghe, Bale and other regions because of their 
political and cultural resistance to the Amhara-Tigray domination. It also imprisoned, tortured or 
hanged prominent Oromo leaders, such as Mamo Mazamir and Haile Mariam Gamada who 
organized and led the Macca-Tuulama Self-Help Association in the early 1960s. The military 
regime that emerged in 1974 under the leadership Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam continued 
state terrorism, dictatorship, and Ethiopian colonial policies. Currently, the Meles regime is 
continuing similar colonial policies and practices in Oromia and other places. 
When Oromo activists and the people started to resist the military regime, it intensified 
its state terrorism. The Military regime (derg) and its supporters committed massive human 
rights violations in the name of the so-called Revolution. According to Norman J. Singer,  
 
Those killed in the first three months of the campaign of the ‘Red Revolutionary Terror' . . . numbered 
around 4000-5000 [in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) alone], the killings continued in March 1978, spreading to 
the rest of the country . . . Those detained for political instruction numbered from 30,000 upwards . . .  
Torture methods emphasized in the Red Terror . . . included severe beating on the head, soles of the feet . . .  
and shoulders, with the victim hung by the wrists or suspended by wrists and feet from a horizontal bar . . . 
; sexual torture of boys and girls, including pushing bottles or red-hot iron bars into girls' vaginas; and other 
cruel methods.16  
 
 The derg continued its mass imprisonments and killings. In 1980, one Oromo source 
mentioned that "the Oromo constitutes the majority of the more than two million prisoners that 
glut Ethiopia's jails today"17 In the 1980s, thousands of Oromo nationalists were murdered or 
imprisoned; the regime also terrorized other elements of Oromo society. According to Gunnar 
                                                     
13 Ibid, p. 20. 
14 Bulatovich, ibid, p. 21. 
15The Ethiopian settlers continued to depopulate Oromia through slave trade until the 1930s when the Italian fascists abolished 
slavery to recruit adequate labor for their agricultural plantations in the Horn of Africa. The nafxanya-gabbar system was also 
abolished during this time through the same process. Bonnie Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, ibid, p. 135.  
16	  Singer, Norman J. 1978. “Ethiopia: Human Rights, 1948-1978,” Proceeding of the First International Conference on Ethiopian 
Studies. April 13-16, pp. 672-673.	  
17The Oromo Relief Association, 1980, p. 30 
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Hasselblatt, the military government 
 
repeatedly held mass shooting among the Oromo population, hoping to break the free, independent Oromo 
spirit. Sometimes a hundred, sometimes two hundred men were shot on this raised dry field . . . and were 
buried with bulldozers. Over years this procedure was repeated several times. When the method did not 
work and the Oromo population could not be forced into submission, other methods were used. The victims 
were made to lie down with their heads on stone, and their skulls were smashed with another stone. The . . . 
government . . . tried everything to consolidate its reign of terror and exploitation of Oromia . . . . When the 
Oromo movement could not be quenched by shooting or by the smashing of skulls, [the government] came 
up with a new idea. Men’s testicles were smashed between a hammer and an anvil. Three men tortured and 
maimed in this way are still living.18 
 
Ethiopia has maintained its oppressive and repressive structures on the Oromo by the assistance 
of successive global powers, namely, Great Britain, the United States, former Soviet Union, and 
China.19 As the former USSR supported the Mengistu regime, the US, powerful European 
countries and China are supporting the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government. 
 Since 1992, the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime20 has controlled the Oromo and 
denied them the freedom of expression, association, organization, the media, and all forms of 
communication and information networks. This government has been focusing on brutally 
attacking the Oromo national movement led by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and on 
robbing the economic resources of Oromia in order to enrich the Tigrayan elites and their 
collaborators and to specifically develop the Tigrayan region. To achieve its political and 
economic objectives, the regime primarily uses its puppet organization known as the Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) which was created and is today controlled by the 
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF); the OPDO is led by Tigrayan cadres, elements of 
Oromo speaking colonial settlers, and opportunistic Oromos who would do anything in exchange 
for luxurious lifestyles. 
 The minority Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government is attempting to give a final solution for 
a large political problem that has existed for several centuries—the relationship between the 
Oromos and their Amhara-Tigrayan colonizers. As we know from history, the policy of targeting 
and exterminating indigenous peoples exists in different parts of the world, and it has been an 
integral practice of the racialized capitalist world system since the 16th century. While claiming 
to promote Christian civilization, modernity, and commerce, European colonialists exterminated 
indigenous peoples in the Americas, Australia, Asia, and Africa over a period of several 
centuries in order to transfer their resources to European colonial settlers and their descendants. 
Specifically, the plans and actions that King Leopold of Belgium had for the Congo or Andrew 
Jackson of the United States for the Cherokees or colonial Germany for the Herero and Nama 
peoples in South West Africa (Nambia)21 are very similar to the grand plan and action the Meles 
government has for the Oromo nation. 
                                                     
18 Gunnar Hasselblatt, “After Fourteen Years: Return to Addis Ababa—and to a Free Oromia,” December 1991-January 1992,” A 
Travel Diary, Berlin, pp. 17-19. 
19See Asafa Jalata, Fighting Against the In justice of the State and Globalization.  
20The Ethiopian state has been authoritarian to Amhara and Tigrayan communities; it has been terrorist regime to the colonized 
peoples like Oromo because it has been ruling by practicing state-terrorism and massive human rights violations. 	  
21	  In his book King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, Adam Hochschild (1998) vividly 
explains how King Leopold II of Belgium terrorized the people of Congo by dispossessing their lands and reducing them to semi-
slaves in order to force them to collect ivory and harvest wild rubber. While claiming to develop the Congo Free States and to 
promote a humanitarian cause, King Leopold II established policies that resulted in the destruction of more than five million 
Africans by murder, diseases, and hunger. His Force Publique Officers led by a few Belgians and staffed by the natives 
committed horrendous crimes against humanity by burning villages, hanging, torturing, raping, flogging, and mutilating in order 
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 The Meles regime is now completing the forced removal of Oromos from the areas 
surrounding Finfinnee (Addis Ababa).22 Furthermore, by evicting the Oromo farmers from their 
homelands with nominal or without compensation, the Meles regime has already leased several 
millions of hectares of Oromo lands to so-called investors from China, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, 
India, Malaysia, Nigeria, as well as from Europe.23 If the policy of land expropriation is allowed 
to continue Tigrayans, Chinese, Djiboutians, Indians, Malaysians, Nigerians, Arabs and 
Europeans will soon replace the Oromo people. Meles never sold or leased Tigrayan lands, but 
has expanded modern agricultural development in his homeland, Tigray. When the Oromo are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
to terrorize the people and force them to work for the king. This organization is similar to the organization of Meles Zenawi 
called the OPDO that imposes a reign of terror on the Oromo people. Similarly, in his book, Blood and Soil: A World History of 
Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Ben Kiernan (2007) explains how it took four centuries to decimate the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas through war, genocide, terrorism, diseases, and removal. He particularly discusses how the 
president of the United States, Andrew Jackson, destroyed the Cherokee Nation by removing them from their homelands and 
sending them to reservations. Jackson and his supporters and white settlers created civil war among the leadership of the 
Cherokee and made them to fight one another. In The Trail of Tears and Indian Removal, Amy H. Sturgis (2007) explores how 
the United States practiced racial or ethnic cleansing on the Cherokee nation. When the Cherokee people were removed from 
Georgia between 1838 and1839, about eight hundred Cherokee perished, and they arrived in Oklahoma without any children and 
only a few elders. When the Herero and Nama peoples of Namibia resisted Germany colonialism, the German soldiers and 
settlers developed a plan to carry out a shoot-to-kill policy. They conducted extrajudicial killings, established concentration 
camps, and employed forced labor and death camps. The German colonial governor expressed the plan of Germany: “15 years 
from now, there will not be much left of the natives” (quoted in Kiernan, 2007: 381). This plan was implemented between 1904 
and 1905 when the majority of Herero and Nama were exterminated. For further discussion, see Edwin Herbert, Small Wars and 
Skirmishes 1902—18, (Nottingham, Great Britain: Foundry Books, 2003).	  
22 See for example, Kenate Worku, “The Expansion of Addis Ababa and its Impact on the Surrounding Areas: A Preliminary 
Study of the Nefas Silk Lafto District,” The Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 97-131.	  
23 Tamrat G. Giorgis (2009: 1), Addis Fortune staff writer, explains in the following: “A new global trend is rising whereby 
companies from emerging economies grab vast land in poor host nations to grow and export cereals and grains to their home 
countries. It has happened here in Bako [, Oromia,], where people from India have been granted tens of thousands of hectares of 
land for commercial farming. The locals however, are unhappy.” Giorgis, Tamrat G. “A Stranger Comes to Town.” Addis 
Fortune. Vol. 10, no. 486. August 23, 2009.  p. 1. 
< http://www.addisfortune.com/Vol%2010%20No%20486%20Archive/agenda.htm>. While the Indian company Karuturi Global 
LTD has invested 4.3 billion dollars to lease 765,000 hectares of farmland from the Ethiopian government, peasant farmers have 
lost the lands they once farmed for subsistence to foreign investors and a land-expropriating government. Giorgis notes that 
Olivier De Schutter, a UN rapporteur, explained the central problem in this phenomenon: “‘frequently, they [farmers] do not have 
property titles to the land upon which they depend for their survival and well-being. They do not have possibilities of legal 
recourse in the event of expropriation’.” Besides India, various other foreign investors have been seizing subsistence farmable 
land: Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, just purchased 20,000 sqm of land in Oromia, the region known as the 
breadbasket of Ethiopia, to invest in tourism and hotels; Ismael Omar Guelleh, president of Djibouti, purchased 10,000 sqm of 
land in Bishoftu, Oromia, (“Debre Zeit”) to build “a holiday home” and 3,000 hectares in Bale, Oromia, for agriculture 
production; and Egypt made a multimillion-dollar agricultural investment in 20,000 hectares of land.  What is critical to note here 
is that these lands are in Oromia, the land of the Oromos—the primary political targets of the government. See O’Kadameri, 
Billie. “Indian Company Acquires 765, 000 hectares of land in Ethiopia.” Ethiopian Review. November 2009. < 
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/11418>. Giorgis, Tamrat. “A Stranger Comes to Town.” Addis Fortune. Vol. 10, No. 
486. August 23, 2009. p. 3. <http://www.addisfortune.com/Vol%2010%20No%20486%20Archive/agenda.htm>. 
“World Leaders are Taking Notice of Land in Debre Zeit.” Capital. Vol. 12. No. 577. 
<http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12046:global-village&catid=12:local-
news&Itemid=4>. What does this prioritization of foreign economic investments over the land rights of Oromo farmers mean for 
the hunger and malnutrition crises? With the WHO estimating in September 2009 that 6.2 million people in Ethiopia were in 
urgent need of food assistance, the subsistence farmers who lost their farms to government land expropriation and foreign 
investors are likely to join or have already joined this 6.2 million. Furthermore, what remains unanswered or unverified by 
documentation is where the money paid by investors is ending up. While the WHO makes such chilling projections about the 
hunger crisis, Ethiopian news and opinion journal Ethiopian Review announced in December 2009 that Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi had amassed a net worth of $1.2 billion making him the “11th richest head of government in the world.”  Although it is 
quite difficult to currently prove from where Zenawi accumulated such wealth, there should be a serious concern as to how the 
leader of one of the poorest and most hungry countries in the world has been able to attain such prosperity. See “Ethiopia: 
Emergency and Humanitarian Action.” Weekly update: September 13, 2009. World Health Organization. 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/eth/sitreps/13september2009/en/index.html>. 
“Editing War over Ethiopian Dictator’s Net Worth.” Ethiopian Review.  <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/11785>.	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facing abject poverty and hunger, Tigrayan elite who depended on international food aid in the 
1980s for their survival, are rich and powerful today. The Meles regime also sells Oromo 
minerals and other natural resources while evicting and impoverishing the Oromo people. 
Whenever the Oromo resist, the regime mercilessly brutalizes or kills them. 
 The political and military leaders of the Meles government are literally gangsters and 
robbers; they use state power to expropriate state corporations and lands in the name of 
privatization—all with the blessing of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 
achieving its political and economic objectives, the Meles regime has been engaging in political 
repression, state terrorism, genocidal massacres, and gross human rights violations in Oromia 
and other regional states. Since the Oromo people have been resisting to Tigrayan colonial 
policies, they have been targeted by the Meles regime; they have been attacked and terrorized 
because of their economic resources, their acceptance of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as 
their national leadership, and their refusal to submit to the orders of Tigrayan authorities and 
their collaborators.  
 This regime has banned independent Oromo organizations including the OLF and 
declared war on those organizations and the Oromo people. It even outlawed Oromo journalists 
and other writers and closed down Oromo newspapers. As Mohammed Hassen asserts, “The 
attack on the free press has literally killed the few publications in the Oromo language in the 
Latin alphabet. The death of Oromo publications . . . has been a fatal blow to the flowering of 
Oromo literature and the standardization of the Oromo language itself. The Oromo magazines 
that have disappeared include Gada, Biftu, Madda Walaabuu, Odaa, and the Urjii magazine . . . 
Since 2002, there has not been a single newspaper or magazine that has expressed the legitimate 
political opinions of the Oromo in Ethiopia.”24 Almost all Oromo journalists are either in prison 
or killed, or in exile. The regime also banned Oromo musical groups and all professional 
associations.  
 Expanding their political repression, regional authorities formed quasi-government 
institutions known as gott and garee to maintain tighter political control of Oromia; they 
“imposed these new structures on . . .  [rural] communities . . . . More disturbing, regional 
authorities are using the gott and garee to monitor the speech and personal lives of the rural 
population, to restrict and control the movements of residents, and to enforce farmers’ attendance 
at ‘meetings’ that are thinly disguised OPDO political rallies.”25 Generally speaking, the Meles 
government has continued to eliminate or imprison politically conscious and self-respecting 
Oromos. Today, thousands of Oromos are in official and secret prisons simply because of their 
nationality and their resistance to injustice. After jailed and released from prison after six years, 
Seye Abraha, the former Defense Minister of the regime who had previously participated in the 
massacring and imprisoning thousands of Oromos, testified on January 5, 2008, to his audience 
in the state of Virginia in the U. S. that “esir betu Oromigna yinager,” (“the prison speaks 
Oromiffa [the Oromo language]”) and also noted that “about 99% of the prisoners in Qaliti are 
Oromos.”26  
 The Tigrayan state bureaucrats believe that Oromo intellectuals, businessmen and 
women, conscious Oromo farmers, students, and community and religious leaders are their 
                                                     
24 Mohammed Hassen, “Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo,” Northeast African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2002, 
p. 31. 
25 Human Rights Watch, May 2005, Vol. 17, No. 7 (A), p. 2. 
26 Seye Abraha was a founder and former political bureau member of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. He was a 
chauvinist Tigrayan who did not hide his negative attitudes about the Oromos and the OLF, when he was the Defense Minister of 
Ethiopia; See “The Prison speaks Oromiffa,” Ethiopian Review, January 17, 2008. Seye was jailed in Qaliti prison.	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enemies, and, hence, should be eliminated through terrorism and genocide.27 State terrorism is 
associated with issues of control over territory and resources and the construction of political and 
ideological domination.28 State terrorism manifests itself as lethal violence in the form of war, 
assassination, murder, castration, burying alive, throwing off cliffs, hanging, torture, rape, 
poisoning, forcing people to submission by intimidation, beating, and disarmament of citizens.29 
The methods of killing include burning, bombing, the cutting of throats or arteries in the neck, 
strangulation, shooting, and the burying of people up to their necks in the ground. The agents and 
militia of Meles have burned houses and entire villages, exterminating thousands of Oromo men, 
women, and children.  
 The Meles regime also practices different forms of torture on imprisoned Oromos and 
others. Former prisoners have testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly together on their 
backs and their naked bodies were whipped; large containers or bottles filled with water were 
fixed to their testicles, or if they were women, bottles or poles were pushed into their vaginas.30 
There were prisoners who were locked up in empty steel barrels and tormented with heat in the 
tropical sun during the day and with cold at night.31 There were also prisoners who were forced 
into pits so that fire could be made on top of them.32 The cadres, soldiers, and officials of the 
regime have frequently raped Oromo girls and women to demoralize them and their communities 
and to show how Tigrayan rulers and their collaborators wielded limitless power. As Bruna 
Fossati, Lydia Namarra and Peter Niggli report, "in prison women are often humiliated and 
mistreated in the most brutal fashion. Torturers ram poles or bottles into their vaginas, connect 
electrodes to the lips of their vulva, or the victims are dragged into the forest and gang-raped by 
interrogation officers."33  
 Ethiopian soldiers have collected young Oromo girls and women into concentration 
camps and gang raped them in front of their relatives, fathers, brothers, and husbands to 
humiliate them and the Oromo people. State-sanctioned rape is a form of terrorism. The use of 
sexual violence is also a tactic of genocide that a dominant ethnonational group practices in order 
to destroy a subordinate ethnonational group. What Catherine MacKinnon says about ethnic 
cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina applies to the sexual abuse of Oromo women by 
the Tigrayan-led regime: “It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make 
the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you 
                                                     
27 See Hizbawi Adera, a TPLF/EPRDF Political Pamphlet, December 1996-February 1997, Vol. 4, No. 7. 
28 Annamarie Oliverio explains two essential features of state terrorism: “First, the state reinforces the use of violence as a viable, 
effective, mitigating factor for managing conflict; second, such a view is reinforced by culturally constructed and socially 
organized processes, expressed through symbolic forms, and related in complex ways to present social interests. Within 
increasing economic and environmental globalization, gender politics, and the resurgence of nationalities within territorial 
boundaries, the discourse of terrorism, as a practice of statecraft, is crucial to the construction of political boundaries. As such, 
terrorism is invoked in the art of statecraft when multiple, often conflicting versions of the past are produced and, at particular 
historical moments, become sites of intense struggles.” Annamarie Oliverio, “The State of Injustice,” ibid, p. 52.	  
29 See Sue Pollock, "Ethiopia-Human Tragedy in the Making: Democracy or Dictatorship?" The Oromia Support Group, 1996; 
Sue Pollock, "Politics and Conflict: Participation and Self-determination in Ethiopia: Conquest and the Quest for Freedom and 
Democracy, edited by Seyoum Y. Hameso, T. Trueman, and T. E. Erena, (London: TSC Publications, 1997), pp. 81-110; Trevor 
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leave your home and never want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told 
to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, 
to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.”34 
 The Tigrayan-led regime has used various mechanisms in repressing, controlling and 
destroying the Oromo people. It has imprisoned or killed thousands of Oromo women and men. 
Its agents have murdered prominent community leaders and left their corpses for hyenas by 
denying them burial to impose terror on the Oromo people.  Furthermore, relatives of the 
murdered Oromos are not allowed to cry publicly to express their grievances, a once cultural 
practice.35 For instance, in 2007, the Meles militia killed twenty Oromos and left their corpses 
for hyenas on the mountain of Suufi in Eastern Oromia.36 According to Human Rights Watch, 
“Since 1992, security forces have imprisoned thousands of Oromo on charges of plotting armed 
insurrection on behalf of the OLF. Such accusations have regularly been used as a transparent 
pretext to imprison individuals who publicly question government policies or actions. Security 
forces have tortured many detainees and subjected them to continuing harassment and abuse for 
years after their release. That harassment in turn has often destroyed victims’ ability to earn a 
livelihood and isolated them from their communities.”37  
The Meles regime has even targeted Oromia’s environment and its animals. According to 
Mohammed Hassen, 
Oromo men, women, children, animals, and even the Oromo environment are all targets of the TPLF’s 
tyranny. In cases where Oromo pastoralists were suspected of harboring OLF guerrilla fighters, TPLF 
soldiers punished them by destroying or confiscating their cattle or by poisoning the wells from which the 
cattle drank. On many occasions Oromo farmers, suspected of feeding OLF fighters, saw their farms 
burned to the ground and the defenseless members of their households brutally murdered. In 2000, when 
the TPLF government suspected OLF guerrillas of hiding in the forests of Oromia, its agents set fires that 
caused catastrophic environmental destruction in Oromia and other states in southern Ethiopia.38 
In addition to such environmental destruction and the murdering and raping of Oromos, the 
Meles regime has engaged in the genocidal massacres of Oromos. This regime has engaged in 
such crimes with little or no opposition from Western powers, particularly the United States. All 
these crimes against humanity are committed in the name of democracy and development. 
Article II of the United Nations Convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”39  
 Kurt Jonassohn explains genocide as the planned destruction of any economic, political 
or social group.40 According to Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, “GENOCIDE is a form of one-
                                                     
34 Catharine MacKinnon, “Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,” Harvard Women’s Law, Journal 17, 1994, pp. 11-12.  
35	  For example, the wife of Ahmed Mohamed Kuree, a seventy year-old elderly farmer, expressed on February 21, 2007, on the 
Voice of America, Afaan Oromo Program the following:35 “We found his prayer beads, his clothes and a single bone of his 
which the hyenas had left behind after devouring the rest of his body, and we took those items home. What is more, after we got 
home, they [government agents] condemned us for going to Gaara Suufii and for mourning. For fear of repercussions, we have 
not offered the customary prayer for my husband by reading from the Qur’an. Justice has not been served. That is where we are 
today.”	  
36 Ahmed Mohamed Kuree was one of these Oromos. Another Oromo, Ayisha Ali, a fourteen year-old teenager, was also killed 
and eaten by hyenas. Her mother said on the Voice of America, Afaan Oromo Program the following: “After we heard the rumor 
about the old man [Ahmed Mohamed Kuree] I followed his family to Gaara Suufii [in search of my daughter]. There we found 
her skirt, sweater, underwear and her hair, braided . . . That was all we found of my daughter’s remains.” Ayisha was probably 
raped before she was killed. 
37 Human Rights Watch, 2005, pp. 1-2. 
38 Mohammed Hassen, “Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo,” pp.37-38. 
39 Quoted in Kurt Jonassohn, Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations: In Comparative Perspective, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers), 1998, p. 9. 	  
40 Ibid. 
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sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that and 
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”41 Chalk and Jonassohn identify two major types 
of genocide:42 the first type is used to colonize and maintain an empire by terrorizing people 
perceived to be real or potential enemies. In this case, the main purpose of practicing genocide is 
to acquire land and other valuable resources. Then the maintenance of colonial domination by 
state elites requires the establishment of a cultural and ideological hegemony that can be 
practiced through genocidal massacres. By destroying elements of a population that resists 
colonial domination, hegemony can be established on the surviving population. This is the 
second type of genocide; this form of genocide is called ideological genocide. Jonassohn notes 
that ideological genocide develops “in nation-states where ethnic groups develop chauvinistic 
ideas about their superiority and exclusiveness.”43  
 The Tigrayan-led government sees Oromia as part of its empire, controls all of Oromia’s 
resources, and attacks the Oromo since it perceives them as its potential or real enemies. It 
engages in genocide as Chalk and Johnassohn explain above with the intention of destroying the 
part of the Oromo nation composed of nationalists and leaders. Tigrayan state leaders are 
claiming to promote political ideologies such as “revolutionary democracy” and “federalism,” 
while at gunpoint attempting to legitimize Tigrayan ethnocracy and state power. They deny that 
they engage in massive human rights violations by claiming that they are democrats and 
revolutionaries and by also destroying the records of their political crimes. Johnassohn’s 
description of a conspiracy of “collective denial” of genocide is applicable to the denial of the 
occurrence of genocide in the Ethiopian Empire. According to Johnassohn, “There are many 
reasons for this: (a) in many societies such materials are not written down, or are destroyed 
rather than preserved in archives; (b) many perpetrators have recourse to elaborate means of 
hiding the truth, controlling access to information, and spreading carefully contrived 
disinformation; and (c) historically, most genocides were not reported because  . . .  there appears 
to have existed a sort of conspiracy of ‘collective denial’ whereby the disappearance of a people 
did not seem to require comment or even mention.”44  
While the Tigrayan regime attempts to eliminate Oromo leaders through genocide in 
order to deny the Oromo their own political leadership, it prepares Tigrayan children for 
positions of leadership by providing them access to better education. This regime also limits 
educational opportunities to Oromo children to maintain racial/ethnic division of labor. Although 
it is impossible to know exactly at this time how many Oromos have been murdered by the 
Meles government, Mohammed Hassen estimates that between 1992 and 2001, about 50,000 
killings and 16,000 disappearances (euphemism for secret killings) took place in Oromia; he also 
notes that 90 percent of the killings were not reported.45 The Meles government hides its criminal 
activities and “does not keep written records of its extrajudicial executions and prolonged 
detention of political prisoners.”46 Furthermore, the massive killings and genocide committed on 
the Sheko, Mezhenger, Sidama, Annuak, and Ogaden Somali peoples have shocked some 
                                                     
41 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1990, p. 23. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Kurt Johnassohn, ibid, p. 23. 
44 Ibid, p. 11. 
45 Mohammed Hassen “Is Genocide Against the Oromo in Ethiopia Possible,” Paper Presented at the Fourth International 
Biennial Conference of the Association of Genocide Scholars, Radisson Hotel, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 10, 2001.	  
46 Ibid, p. 30. 
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sections of the international community.47 According to the Associated Press, Meles Zenawi and 
his followers are possible targets of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as are many leaders 
of African countries.48  
The president of Genocide Watch, Gregory Stanton, wrote on March 23, 2009, an open 
letter to the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights admiring the action that the 
ICC took in issuing a warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and calling 
upon them to investigate the crimes Meles and his government have committed and still are 
committing against humanity in the Horn of Africa: 
The action that the International Criminal Court has taken in this situation has restored hope to peace and 
justice loving people, affirming that international human rights law not only exists on paper, but in reality. 
It also sends an important message to perpetrators throughout the world that impunity for their crimes is not 
assured forever; which may be a primary reason that one of the first leaders to defend Omar al-Bashir and 
condemn the warrant was Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, whose government has also been 
implicated in a pattern of widespread perpetration of serious human rights atrocities in Ethiopia and in 
Somalia. He and those within his government may be keenly aware of their own vulnerability to similar 
actions by the ICC in the future that could upend a deeply entrenched system of government-supported 
impunity that has protected perpetrators from any accountability.49 
 Stanton demonstrates in this letter how the Meles government has committed heinous 
crimes by being involved “in the inciting, the empowerment or the perpetration of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and even genocide, often justified by them as ‘counter-insurgency.” He 
also states that the Meles government organized Ethiopian National Defense Forces and civilian 
militia groups to ruthlessly massacre 424 persons from the Annuak people in Gambella on 
December 2003 in order to suppress opposition and to “exclude them from any involvement in 
the drilling for oil on their indigenous land.” According to Stanton, as militia groups chanted 
“Today is the day for killing Annuak,” both the military and militias used machetes, axes and 
guns to kill the unarmed victims, frequently raping the women while chanting, “Now there will 
be no more Annuak children.” 
 Reports from Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department, and the Human Rights 
Watch have been continuing to list Zenawi’s government extensive record of chilling crimes 
against the politically and economically oppressed peoples such as the Oromo. The Meles regime 
recently passed the so-called anti-terrorism law to legalize its crimes against humanity and to 
legally intensify its own repressive and terrorist activities. Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism “law could 
provide the Ethiopian government with a potent instrument to crack down on political dissent, 
including peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy that are 
deemed supportive of armed opposition activity.” 50  Generally speaking, the policies and 
practices of the Meles regime have forced millions of Oromos to become political refugees in 
Asia, Europe, Australia, and North America.  
                                                     
47 In 2002, when the Sheko and Mezhenger peoples demanded their rights, the regime killed between 128 and 1,000 people. 
Nobody knows exactly how many people were killed since the government and the victims give different numbers. Similarly, on 
June 21, 2002, between 39 and 100 Sidamas were killed when government soldiers fired at 7,000 peaceful demonstrators in 
Hawas (Awash). Again government forces and colonial settlers committed genocidal massacres on the Annuak people of 
Gambella in December 2003 and beginning 2004; they killed 424 people and displaced about 50, 000 people. Currently, the 
regime is engaged in genocidal massacres, imprisonment, and massive human rights violations in Ogadenia and Oromia.  	  
48 Associate Press, 2009, p. 1. 
49 Stanton, George. 2009. “An Open Letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for   Human Rights,” Website: 
www.genocidewatch.org, accessed on April 1, 2009.	  	  
50 Human Rights Watch, “An Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Law,” updated June 30, 2009, p. 1.	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 The alliance of the West with this regime has frightened neighboring countries such as 
Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Yemen, and turned them against the Oromo struggle and Oromo 
refugees. Using the leverage of Western countries, the Meles regime has pressured neighboring 
governments to return or expel Oromo refugees from their countries. The United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has even failed to provide reasonable protection for 
thousands of Oromo refugees in Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. For example, on 
December 21 and 22, 2000, while five thousand Oromo refugees were refouled to Ethiopia, the 
UNHCR office in Djibouti denied any violation of its mandate had occurred.51 Between 2000 
and 2004, hundreds of Oromo refugees were forced to return to Ethiopia from Djibouti to face 
imprisonment or death.52 “The continuing refoulement of refugees from Djibouti,” notes the 
Oromia Support Group, “especially the large scale refoulement of December 2000 and the 28 
associated deaths by asphyxiation and shooting, should be publicly acknowledged by UNHCR 
and the Djibouti government.”53 The security agents of Ethiopia and neighboring countries still 
capture thousands of Oromo refugees and return them to Ethiopia.  
By crossing borders and entering Somalia and Kenya, agents of the Ethiopian regime 
assassinated prominent Oromo leaders. And still today, the regime is killing prominent Oromos 
in Kenya and Somalia. Just in 2007 and 2008, Ethiopian security forces assassinated Oromos in 
Somalia and Kenya. One human rights organization notes that on February 5, 2008, the 
combined security forces of Ethiopia and Puntland, Somalia, bombed two hotels and 
consequently murdered 65 Oromo refugees and seriously injured more than 100 people.54 In 
2009, the regime killed four Oromos by poisoning their food in Puntland.55  
When it comes to the Oromo, international organizations do not pay attention even if 
terrorist attacks occur and international laws are broken. The Oromo are being denied sanctuary 
in neighboring countries and are also even being denied the right to be refugees to some degree. 
Since some Oromo refugees are not welcomed by neighboring countries and international 
organizations, there are thousands of `internal’ Oromo refugees in Oromia and Ethiopia. Fleeing 
from Ethiopian state terrorism, these internal refugees hide in the bushes and remote villages. 
Suspecting that these internal refugees support the Oromo national struggle, the regime attempts 
to control their movements and the movement of other Oromos.  
When the Meles regime has been mobilizing the West and the imperial system and using 
their resources terrorizing and controlling the Oromo, the revolutionary nationalist Oromo elites 
have failed to consolidate the Oromo national struggle because of their ideological confusion and 
political fragmentation. As we shall see below, due to the lack of coherent, pragmatic, and strong 
political leadership, the Oromo national movement faces challenges from the unstable 
authoritarian-terrorist regime of Meles Zenawi. Moreover, the Oromo national struggle has 
created political and economic opportunities for those reactionary and opportunist Oromos who 
promote their personal and group interests by allying with and working for the Meles regime at 
the cost of the Oromo nation.  
The sad thing is that the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government loots Oromian economic and 
natural resources to pay for the Oromo collaborators it organized as the OPDO to do its dirty job 
in Oromia. Had the Oromo national struggle built itself as a more unified, structured, and strong 
movement, the umbilical cord that links Oromo society to its enemy could have been cut. Today 
                                                     
51	  The Oromia Support Group, “Press Release,” December	  2002,	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  38,	  p.	  17.	  
52 Ibid, July 2003, no. 39, pp. 16-18. 
53 Ibid, December 2002, no. 38, pp. 18-20; July 2003, no. 39, pp. 18-19.	  
54 http://www.humanrightsleague.com/press_Releases.html, 2008 
55 See Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa, “Refugees Poisoned to Death in Puntland, Somalia,” December 19, 2009. 
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the Oromo collaborators that are stuffed in the OPDO mainly maintain such links. Until these 
“social cancers” exist in Oromo society, it cannot be imagined to liberate Oromia from Ethiopian 
settler colonialism. These dangerous social elements survive in Oromo society because of the 
failure of the revolutionary nationalist Oromo elites in establishing a more unified and structured 
organization and leadership that can mobilize most of the Oromo people to defend their national 
interest. At the same time, the fire of Oromummaa survives and expands because of the few 
selfless and determined Oromo nationalists. However, such nationalist leaders need to expand 
their mental horizons to re-map and reinvent the Oromo national movement by providing a 
centralized structured organization and leadership by mobilizing all organizational, cultural, and 
material resources of the Oromo for national survival and self-defense. 
 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Oromo Elites 
As I have explained above, the indigenous independent Oromo leadership was destroyed or 
suppressed by the Ethiopian colonial system until the mid-20th century. At the same time, the 
Ethiopian colonial system created the Oromo collaborative class and imposed on Oromo society. 
Furthermore, the Ethiopian political system was designed to produce, through its educational 
institutions, a small number of Ethiopianized Oromo leaders who would function as 
intermediaries between the Ethiopian ruling class and the Oromo people. It intentionally limited 
the number of formally educated Oromo leaders by denying education to the overwhelming 
majority of Oromos. Through various political and cultural mechanisms, including assimilation, 
political marriage, religion, and divide and conquer policies, the Ethiopian government 
disconnected most of the few educated Oromo vassals from their cultural and historical roots, 
continuously forcing them to show fealty to their suzerain.  
 Only a few persons within nationalist circles clearly understood these complex problems 
by familiarizing themselves with Oromo history, culture, values, and various forms of the Oromo 
resistance to Ethiopian colonialism. These elements initiated the Oromo national movement in 
the early 1960s and the 1970s. Some of those who emerged as Oromo nationalist leaders were 
sometimes collaborators who were initially neutral or opposed to the Oromo nationalist 
movement because of their lack of political consciousness. Generally speaking, Oromo 
collaborative leaders have ensconced themselves in Oromo cities that have been overwhelmingly 
populated by Ethiopian colonial settlers. Ethiopian political, religious, educational, and media 
institutions have had powerful influence on most of this educated Oromo collaborator leadership. 
Consequently, some educated Oromos have joined Ethiopian political organizations and 
institutions. 
 The Ethiopian and Somali governments and other forces opposed to the Oromo 
emancipation; opportunist and reactionary Oromo vassals collaborated with these enemies and 
targeted the few Oromo nationalist intellectuals. Consequently, the founding leadership of the 
Macca-Tuulama Self-help Association (MTSA) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was 
decimated along with the membership of these organizations. In addition, within the Oromo 
nationalist camp, complex political problems and confusions emerged in the 1970s, 1980s, 
1990s, and recently in 2001 and 2008 because of the low level and uneven development of 
Oromummaa, the lack of political experience and maturity, and political opportunism. A few 
individuals, using clan or religious or regional politics have corrupted the movement by 
introducing conflict, suspicion, and other factors. Such problems have undermined the 
development of the Oromo national struggle. As a result, Oromo nationalists have been divided 
into camps that started to fight one another while fighting against the Ethiopian and other anti-
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Oromo forces. In the process, the Oromo national movement has lost outstanding Oromo 
nationalist heroes and heroines.  
 Despite political fragmentation, ideological confusion, and multiplicity of enemies, the 
few Oromo nationalists who have survived the political onslaught from all directions managed to 
maintain the Oromo national movement, particularly the OLF. The political integrity and 
determination of some OLF leaders and members have allowed the movement to spread the 
concepts of Oromummaa and Oromo nationalism among the Oromo people.56 When the Oromo 
people have accepted the OLF, the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government and other semi-fascist 
groups have attempted to totally destroy the Oromo national movement and Oromo nationalists. 
The leadership of the Oromo national movement wasn’t prepared to face this political challenge; 
some of the reasons include (1) the lack of coherent and organic leadership or team leadership; 
(2) the absence of open and honest dialogue; (3) the low level and uneven development of 
Oromummaa and the lack of political, cultural, and ideological strategies with which to build 
Oromummaa; (4) the absence of accountability of some leaders and followers; (5) the attachment 
to borrowed political culture and ideologies; (6) the failure to mobilize Oromo human and 
material resources effectively, and (7) the absence of a more unified structured organization and 
matured leadership.  
 The Oromo national movement has been lacking a coherent and organic leadership as the 
result of the untimely death of some of its founding leaders such as Haile Mariam Gamada, 
Mamo Mazamir, Taddassa Biru, Baro Tumsa, Elemo Qilixu, Magarasa Bari, Demisie Techane, 
Aboma Mitiku, and Muhee Abdo. Despite the fact that there are Oromo political leaders who are 
well educated, to date they have not developed the organizational norms and culture of teamwork 
needed to conceptualize the theoretical, ideological and organizational concepts necessary to 
address the problems of Oromo leadership. The lack of coherent political leadership has denied 
the Oromo national movement the possibility of developing the formal and informal, political 
and social networks that can effectively help in developing Oromummaa and in taking collective 
political actions at the individual, relational and collective levels. Since the formal and informal 
networks have not been integrated, members of the Oromo political leadership have been unable 
to develop the organizational capacity necessary to engage in political dialogue and activities 
both in formal and informal settings.  
 The Oromo elites whether they are in leadership or not lack ideological coherence, 
political maturity, and skills for consensus building. They focus on their narrow perceptions and 
agendas. Hence they jump to form organizations that promote such perceptions and agendas at 
the cost of the national interest. In the 1970s, some Oromo elites joined Ethiopian and Somali 
organizations while a few created the OLF. Furthermore, the lack of ideological and political 
maturity led to the division of the OLF in the 1970s, and recently, in the 2001 and 2008. Without 
creating the Oromo national power, the Oromo elites fight on non-existence power. The Oromo 
elites have formed several nominal liberation fronts and other political organizations without 
engaging in armed and real political struggles. They did not yet establish a political and cultural 
mechanism that helps in resolving their contradictions. The Oromo elites have failed to 
understand that they are on one team that must work together to organize the Oromo nation for 
its liberation.  
 It is impossible to build an effective institutional order or organization without integrating 
formal and informal rules of the society. As a result of the lack of bureaucratic codes and 
                                                     
56 In 1991 along with other Oromo liberation organizations, the OLF hesitantly agreed to join in the formation of the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia and in less than a year it taught its political objectives to the Oromo people. 
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procedures in Oromo tradition, Oromo political leaders and the Oromo community at-large have 
had no immediately-available, culturally-consistent models to draw upon when confronted with 
the need for establishing the bureaucratic structures that are an essential part of the overall 
liberation struggle. As a result, they have reacted in a number of different and contradictory 
ways. This lack of coherence in the leadership in turn has created conditions in which suspicion 
has flourished creating conditions that have prevented open and honest dialogue among leaders 
and between leaders and followers. In absence of a coherent organizational milieu, rumor, 
gossip, and impression management have replaced a critical and open dialogue within the 
movement. Like any movement, the Oromo national movement must develop a collective 
identity that results in collective action. Oromo nationalists cannot develop an Oromummaa that 
facilitates collective action without critical discussion and open dialogue.  
 The role of the leader is very important in building a leadership core through persuasion, 
analytical capacity, capacity to communicate, and capacity to listen and learn. The leader is 
responsible for the creation of formal and informal networks that allow for the development of 
an effective leading political team by bringing together layers of people who share strategic ideas 
to win over others. Recently, the Oromo movement has tried to create an exclusivist leadership 
that does not fit Oromo-centric democratic values. While the Oromo love their heroes and 
heroines and admire them, they expect open dialogue and interaction consistent with their 
democratic political tradition. The Oromo also reject the leadership style of the Habasha. The 
Oromo dislike exclusivist leaders who equate their personal interests with the interests of the 
organization they lead and separate themselves from the rank and file members. Colin Barker 
argues that exclusivist leaders “regard their offices as private property, resisting removal or 
control. To maintain their positions, they develop various means of control . . . The overall result 
is that the mechanism of organization becomes an end in itself.”57  
 Practically speaking, the Oromo political leadership is neither coherent nor exclusivist, 
although there has been an attempt by a few leaders to develop an exclusivist leadership modeled 
on the Habasha political culture. However, there is no question that the leadership of the Oromo 
national movement manifests some exclusivist characters. Just as the Oromo nationalist 
leadership lacks political coherence, some Oromos lack organizational discipline and engage in 
political anarchism or passivism. Without challenging anarchism and passivism among the 
Oromo populace and the exclusivist political tendency of the leadership, the Oromo nationalist 
movement cannot search “for combinations of forms of organization and leadership which are 
practically compatible with larger struggles for popular self-emancipation.”58 Oromo nationalists 
need to speak up and struggle to develop leadership for self-emancipation through facilitating the 
integration of “leading” and “led” selves of the Oromo political leadership.  
 While struggling to build a democratic and coherent political leadership, Oromo 
nationalists must fight against political anarchism, passivism, and anti-leadership sentiment that 
emerge in some Oromo sectors. Anarchist and anti-leadership Oromo elites discourage the 
emergence of strong leadership by engaging in endless debate on secondary issues—such as 
clan, religious, and regional identity—and by making personal attacks on prominent Oromo 
leaders and organizations as a means of avoiding substantive debate. While demanding 
accountability from their leadership, Oromos must fight publicly against an anti-leadership 
ideology. Oromos need to acknowledge, value, encourage, and support an emerging democratic 
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58 Ibid, p. 43. 
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Oromo political leadership since strengthening the leadership of the Oromo movement is 
essential in the struggle to defeat dangerous enemies. Since an amorphous and less structured 
leadership is functionally ineffective, the Oromo national struggle must have a more structured 
leadership that can provide the organizational capacity necessary to eventually take state power 
and establish a functioning democracy consistent with the principles of Oromummaa.  
 Oromo nationalists cannot build a more structured leadership without clearly 
understanding the processes of leadership and followership. According to Robert G. Lord and 
Douglas J. Brown, “Leaders may indeed be people who can be understood in terms of traits and 
behavioral styles, but leadership is a social process that involves both a leader and a follower.”59 
Just as Oromo leaders do not adequately understand the essence and characteristics of their 
followers, the followers lack information about their leaders and leadership. While Oromo 
political leaders like to lecture their followers and sympathizers, they are less interested in 
establishing formal and informal relationships with their followers and sympathizers in order to 
engage them in dialogical conversation. Because they care little about the opinions and 
experiences of their followers, they fail to ask for the input from their followers.  But, as Lord 
and Brown argue, leaders cannot be effective without establishing “a stronger social bond among 
their direct and indirect followers, thus improving the direct and indirect followers’ 
performance.”60  
  Leadership is a processing of influencing followers and others by changing their 
perceptions through closely relating and communicating with them. Similarly, much of the 
Oromo populace has yet to developed constructive mechanisms by which they can influence 
their political leaders and hold them accountable. As a result, they engage in personal attacks and 
debate on peripheral issues blunting the impact of their personal political efforts and delaying the 
development of an effective political leadership. As we have seen, it is difficult to identify the 
weaknesses of the leadership without identifying those of the followership. I recognize that the 
role played by the Oromo national political leadership is dangerous, complex, and difficult. This 
leadership has been politically, ideologically, and militarily attacked both internally and 
externally. To date the movement has been able to survive by developing shared meaning, 
purpose, language, and symbols. But as the complexity of the Oromo movement increases and as 
the number of Oromo nationalists expands, the leadership will not be able to improve its 
organizational capacity without simultaneously developing a degree of internal cohesion, 
leadership expertise, and widespread support through the establishment of effective coalitions 
within and beyond the Oromo nationalist movement.  
 Without (1) changing the past habits, ideologies and approaches, (2) building internal 
cohesion by developing Oromummaa on the individual, relational and collective levels, and (3) 
fully mobilizing Oromo human and economic resources, the current Oromo political leadership 
will continue to face more crises and may eventually become a political liability. The Oromo 
national political leadership must be challenged to abandon its reliance on a narrow political 
circle and borrowed political ideologies and practices. In addition, it must be encouraged to 
embrace Oromo-centric democratic values, using them to develop different forms of 
organizational leadership in Oromo society thus making the dynamic connection between the 
values of Oromo society and its organizational structure.  
                                                     
59 Robert G. Lord and Douglas Brown, Leadership Processes and Followers Self-Identity, (Mahwal, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associate, Inc.: 2004), p. 3.	  
60 Ibid, p. 5. 
16 
 
 The Oromo leadership should be pressured to speak with the Oromo people and listen as 
well, allowing the Oromo community at-large to engage in the process of self-emancipation by 
participating in and owning their national movement. According to Alan Johnson, “Self-
emancipation is a political process in which the oppressed author their own liberation through 
popular struggles which are educational, producing a cognitive liberation” to defeat their 
enemies.61 More than any time in its history, the Oromo national struggle now requires a more 
centralized structured organization and matured national leadership that can learn about the 
Oromo people in order to organize and lead them to take any necessary actions for national 
survival and liberation. 
 
The Main Characteristics of Oromo Society 
After the Oromo were colonized and until Oromo nationalism emerged, Oromoness 
(Oromumma) primarily remained on the personal and the interpersonal levels since the Oromo 
were denied the opportunities to form national institutions. Oromoness was targeted for 
destruction and colonial administrative regions that were established to suppress the Oromo 
people and exploit their resources were glorified and institutionalized. As a result, Oromo 
relational identities have been localized, and not strongly connected to the collective identity of 
national Oromummaa.  
 The Oromo have been separated from one another and prevented from exchanging goods 
and information on national level for more than a century. Their identities have been localized 
into clan families and colonial regions. They were also exposed to different cultures (i.e., 
languages, customs, values, etc.) and religions and adopted some elements of these cultures and 
religions. Consequently, today there are members of Oromo society and elites who have 
internalized clan and externally imposed regional or religious identities because of their low 
level of political consciousness or political opportunism, and the lack of clear understanding of 
Oromummaa or Oromo nationalism. What makes these problems complex is that some Oromos 
who claim that they are nationalists confuse their sub-identities with the Oromo national identity.  
 Oromo relational identities include extended families and clan families. Historically and 
culturally speaking, Oromo clans and clan families never had clear geopolitical boundaries 
among themselves. Consequently, there are clans in Oromo society that have the same name in 
southern, central, northern, western and eastern Oromia. For example, there are Jarso, Gida, 
Karayu, Galan, Nole and Jiru clans all over Oromia. The Ethiopian colonial system and 
borrowed cultural and religious identities were imposed on the Oromo creating regional and 
religious boundaries. Consequently, there were times when Christian Oromos were more 
identified with Habashas and Muslim Oromos were more identified with Arabs, Adares and 
Somalis than they were with other Oromos. Under these conditions, Oromo personal identities, 
such as religion replaced Oromoness, central Oromo values, and core Oromo self-schemas. 
There are Oromos who still confuse such identities with the Oromo central identity.  
 Colonial rulers saw Oromoness as a source of raw material that was ready to be 
transformed into other identities. In the colonial process, millions of Oromos lost their identities 
and assimilate to other peoples. Consequently, the number of Amharas, Tigres, Adares, Gurages, 
and Somalis has increased at the cost of the Oromo population. The Oromo self was attacked and 
distorted by Ethiopian colonial institutions. The attack on Oromo selves at personal, 
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interpersonal and collective-levels has undermined the self-confidence of some Oromo 
individuals by creating an inferiority complex within them. Without the emancipation of Oromo 
individuals from this inferiority complex and without overcoming the ignorance and the 
worldviews that their enemies imposed on them, they cannot have the self-confidence necessary 
to facilitate individual liberation and Oromo emancipation.  
 Because of internal cultural crises and external oppressive institutions, Oromo collective 
norms or organizational culture is at rudimentary level at this historical moment. So some 
comrades in an Oromo organization do not see themselves as members of a team, and they 
engage in undermining members in their team through gossips and rumors. For sake of self-
promotion, they belittle their comrades in his or her absence. Such individuals do not have strong 
organizational culture or norm. Such individuals cannot develop a core of Oromo leadership that 
is required in building a strong liberation organization.  
 Today, the Oromo are diverse and heterogeneous people, and it is impossible to organize 
them for liberation without understanding these complexities. Some Oromo elites do not 
understand these issues. Collective identities are not automatically given, but they are “essential 
outcomes of the mobilization process and crucial prerequisite to movement success.”62 Oromo 
nationalists can only reach a common understanding of Oromoness through open, critical, honest 
dialogue and debate. Fears, suspicions, misunderstandings and hopes or aspirations of Oromo 
individuals or groups should be discussed through invoking Oromo cultural memory and 
democratic principles. Through such discussion a single standard that respects the dignity and 
inalienable human rights of all persons with respect to political, social, and economic interaction 
should be established for all Oromos and their neighbors who support the rights to national self-
determination. 
 Oromo personal and social identities can be fully released and mobilized for collective 
actions if reasonable Oromos recognize that they can freely start to shape their future aspirations 
or possibilities without discrimination. This is only possible through developing an Oromo 
identity on personal and collective levels that is broader and more inclusive than gender, class, 
clan, family, region, and religion. According to S.M. Buechler, “one critical intervening process 
which must occur to get from oppression to resistance is the social construction of a collective 
identity which unites a significant segment of the movement’s potential constituency.”63 While 
recognizing the unity of Oromo peoplehood, it is important to recognize the existence of 
diversity in Oromo society. The lack of open dialogue among Oromo nationalists, political 
leaders, activists, and ordinary citizens on the issue of religious differences and/or the problems 
of colonial regional identities provided opportunities for those who profit from the continued 
subjugation of the Oromo people to employ a divide and conquer strategy by exploiting religious 
and regional differences among the Oromo people.  
 Since Turks, Arabs, Habashas, and Europeans imposed both Islam and Christianity on the 
Oromo in order to psychologically control and dominate them, Oromo nationalists must 
encourage an open dialogue among adherents of an indigenous Oromo religion, Islam and 
Christianity and reach a common understanding of what it means to be an Oromo and the 
positive role religion can play in Oromo society. Also, issues of clans and colonial regional 
identities must be addressed openly and honestly. Since these issues are not openly addressed, 
reactionary forces and opportunist Oromo individuals and groups turn Oromo on one another to 
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use them. Basing our understanding of these Oromo issues on Oromummaa eliminates 
differences that may emerge because of religious plurality and regional differences. The 
Ethiopian colonial regions do not correspond to Oromo group or regional identities. As a result 
the political diversity of Oromo society can and should transcend regional identities based on the 
boundaries of colonial regions.  
 The Oromo political problems have emerged primarily from low level of political 
consciousness, attitudes, behavior, and perceptions that have been shaped by a culture that 
valued domination and exploitation and have seen diversity and equality as threats to the colonial 
institutions most Oromos passed through. These problems still play a significant role in 
undermining the development of Oromummaa and the organizational capacity of the Oromo 
national movement. The behavior and political practices of most Oromos and elites and leaders 
of Oromo institutions in the Diaspora—like churches and mosques, associations, and political 
and community organizations—demonstrate that the impact of the ideology of domination and 
control that was impacted by Ethiopian colonial institutions and organizations is far-reaching. 
Despite the fact that the Oromo are proud of their democratic tradition, their behavior and 
practices in politics, religion, and community affairs indicate that they have learned more from 
Habashas and Oromo chiefs than from the gada system of democracy.  
 While the social and cultural construction of the Oromo collective identity is ongoing 
process, this process cannot be completed without the recognition that Oromo society is 
composed of a set of diverse and heterogeneous individuals and groups with a wide variety of 
cultural and economic experiences. Hence, Oromo nationalists need to recognize and value the 
diversity and unity of the Oromo people because “people who participate in collective action do 
so only when such action resonates with both an individual and a collective identity that makes 
such action meaningful.”64 In every society, personal and social identities are flexible, and are 
not rigid and monolithic. Similarly, Oromo self-identity exists at the personal, interpersonal, and 
collective levels with this confederation of identity being continuously shaped by Oromo 
historical and cultural memory, current conditions, and hopes and aspirations for the future. 
According to Robert G. Lord and Douglas J. Brown, the self “is believed to be a system or a 
confederation of self-schemas that are derived from past experience . . . .  In essence, the self is a 
collection of small, relatively independent processing units that are elicited in different contexts 
and each of which has specific cognitive, emotional, motivational, and behavioral 
consequences.”65  
 The Oromo social selves emerge from the interplay between intimate personal relations 
and less personal relations. The former comprise the interpersonal or relational identity and the 
latter are a collective identity. The relational-level identity is based on perceptions or views of 
others about an individual. Thus, individual Oromos have knowledge of themselves from their 
personal viewpoints as well as knowledge from the perspective of significant others and larger 
social groups. The concept of individual self emerges from complex conditions that reflect past 
and present experiences and future possibilities. The self-concept allows individuals to have “the 
capacity to reinstate a past situation and locate themselves in it; they also have the capacity to 
project the self into future contexts, anticipating possible actions and their consequences for the 
self.” 66 Some Oromos are more familiar with their personal and relational selves than they are 
with their Oromo collective self, because their level of Oromummaa is rudimentary.  
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 Oromo individuals have intimate relations with their family members, friends, and local 
communities. These interpersonal and close relations foster helping, nurturing, and caring 
relationships. Without developing these micro-relationships into the macro-relationship of 
Oromummaa, the building of Oromo national organizational capacity is illusive. Organizing 
Oromos requires learning about the multiplicity and flexibility of Oromo identities and 
fashioning from them a collective identity that encompasses the vast majority of the Oromo 
populace. This process can be facilitated by an Oromo political leadership that is willing to 
develop an understanding of the breadth of the diversity of Oromo society looking for those 
personal and relational identities that can be used to construct an Oromo collective identity, 
expanding Oromummaa. Change starts with individuals who are both leaders and followers.  
 Culture, collective grievances, and visions connect leaders and followers in oppressed 
society like the Oromo. Consequently, to be effective the Oromo political leadership must be 
guided by Oromo-centric cardinal values and principles that reflect honesty, fairness, single 
standard, equality and democracy in developing Oromummaa. Lord and Brown assert that “a 
critical task for leaders may be to construct group identities for followers that are both appealing 
and consistent with a leader’s goals. Indeed, this is a critical aspect of political leadership. 
Effective political leaders do not simply take context and identity as given, but actively construct 
both in a way that reconfigures the social world.”67 The political leadership of Oromo society 
needs to understand the concept and essence of the changing selves of Oromos. These self-
concepts include cognitive, psychological and behavioral activities of Oromo individuals. 
 Collective grievances, the Oromo language and history, the historical memory of the 
gada system and other forms of Oromo culture, and the hope for liberation have helped in 
maintaining fragmented connections among various Oromo groups. The emergence of Oromo 
nationalism from underground to public discourse in the 1990s allowed some Oromos to openly 
declare their Oromummaa without clearly realizing the connection between the personal and 
interpersonal selves and the Oromo collectivity. This articulation occurred without strong 
national institutions and organizational capacity that can cultivate and develop Oromummaa 
through transcending the political and religious barriers that undermine the collective identity of 
the Oromo. Oromo nationalists cannot build effective national institutions and organizations 
without taking Oromo personal, interpersonal and collective-level Oromo selves to a new level. 
Oromo collective selves develop through relations with one another. Good interpersonal relations 
and good treatment of one another create sense of security, confidence, sense of belonging, 
strong and effective bonds, willingness to admit and deal with mistakes and increase 
commitment to political objectives and organizations.  
 The individuality of an Oromo can be observed and examined in relation to the concept 
of self which is linked to psychological processes and outcomes, such as motivation, affection, 
self-management, information processing, interpersonal relations, commitment, dignity and self-
respect, self-preservation and so forth. The Oromo self-concept as an extensive knowledge 
structure contains all pieces of information on self that an individual Oromo internalizes in his or 
her value systems. Every Oromo has a self-schema or a cognitive schema that organizes both 
perceptional and behavioral information. An individual’s self-schema can be easily captured by 
accessible knowledge that comes to mind quickly to evaluate information on any issue. The 
Oromo self is the central point at which personality, cognitive schema and social psychology 
meet. The Oromo self consists both personal or individual and social identities. The former is 
based on an individual’s comparison of oneself to other individuals and reveals one’s own 
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uniqueness and the latter are based on self-definition in relation to others or through group 
membership.  
 Without recognizing and confronting these issues at all levels, the Oromo movement 
cannot build its organizational capacity. The social experiment of exploring and understanding 
our internal selves at individual, relational and collective selves must start with the Oromo elites 
who aspire to organize and lead the Oromo people. Since the ideological and organizational tools 
that Oromo elites have borrowed from other cultures have reached their maximum limit of 
capacities and cannot move the Oromo movement forward in the quest for achieving self-
determination and human liberation, Oromo nationalists must reorganize their approaches based 
on Oromummaa and gada democratic heritage. The Oromo elites have passed through schools 
that were designed to domesticate or “civilize” them and to mold them into intermediaries 
between the Oromo people and those who dominated and exploited them.  
 They have been disconnected from their history, culture, language, and worldviews, and 
have been trained by foreign educational and religious institutions that glorified the culture, 
history, language and religion of others. Consequently, some Oromo elites do not adequately 
understand Oromo history, culture and worldview. Today, such individuals have emerged as 
agents of the Tigrayan elites by joining the OPDO and are terrorizing the Oromo people. 
Although the Oromo movement has achieved many important accomplishments, the 
organizational and ideological tools that it has used did not provide an effective basis for 
organizing the Oromo people and enabling them to defend themselves from their enemies. At 
present, the Oromo human and material resources are scattered and used by the enemies of the 
Oromo nation. 
 Without a structured organization and national leadership, the Oromo people cannot take 
effective political actions that involve national self-defense and a popular and wide rebellion 
through the total mobilization of the nation. For many generations, young Oromos have been 
forced to fight as mercenaries and defended the interest of the Ethiopian state elites that have 
repressed and exploited their society. Even the Siad Barre government of Somalia used Oromo 
fighters as mercenaries. The Habasha elites and their Oromo collaborators claim that the Oromo 
fighters have built Ethiopia, and hence they are Ethiopians like Amharas and Tigrayans. To be 
forced to fight for their colonizers cannot make a people to share identity and to own a country 
with their colonizers. Therefore, fighting for the Ethiopian state could not make Oromo fighters 
equal citizens with their colonizers; the Ethiopian state they have fought for has maintained their 
second-class citizenship status through violence. Therefore, the Oromo elites and society must 
stop the utilization of the Oromo youth as raw materials by the Ethiopian state elites or others. 
The Oromo national movement by learning from the gada system must be able to mobilize and 
organize the Oromo youth to fight for the liberation of their nation and their fatherland, Oromia.   
 
The Major Opportunities and Constraints for the Oromo Struggle   
The Oromo national movement that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s by a few determined 
nationalists reached the Oromo populace in the early 1990s. It took almost three decades and 
heavy sacrifices in the lives and sufferings of these few nationalists to resurrect the Oromo name, 
language, nationhood, and the name of Oromia from the dustbin of history. In this process, 
Oromummma—Oromo national identity, culture, and nationalism—has been resurrected. 
Currently, the external and internal enemies of the Oromo people use the resurrected names and 
the Oromo language while attacking and suppressing the Oromo nationalists and self-respecting 
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Oromos. Since they could not stop the rising wave of Oromummaa, the Tigrayan colonial elites 
have used Oromo mercenaries to gradually destroy it. 
 Ethiopian colonialism had disconnected the Oromo nation from the international 
community for more than a century. However, with the resurrection of the Oromo national 
identity, culture, and nationalism, the Oromo people started to be represented in the world by its 
political refugees. For the first time in Oromo history, the Oromo people started to have its 
Diaspora that has a great potential to link Oromia to the global community. The Oromo-
American Citizens Council is an element of the Oromo Diaspora. The imposition of Ethiopian 
state terrorism on the Oromo to suppress Oromo nationalism created and expanded the Oromo 
Diaspora in the world. In this process, a few serious Oromo intellectuals emerged on the global 
level and dug the graveyards of history to uncover Oromo history and culture and to publish 
books and journals that are stored in world libraries. Furthermore, in Oromia, millions of the 
qubee generation emerged as demonstrated by the recent Oromo student movement. The national 
projects that were designed by the MTSA and the OLF produced fundamental results that have 
become the cornerstones of the Oromo national struggle. These achievements are great political 
opportunities for the Oromo nation.  
 Unfortunately, since the Oromo national struggle did yet achieve its main objectives, the 
enemies of the Oromo people have created political constraints to abort the struggle. There are 
millions of Oromos who have betrayed their nation to satisfy their economic interests. By 
creating and building the OPDO and recruiting such Oromos to this subservient organization, the 
Meles regime uses them to attack the OLF and to suppress and control the Oromo people. The 
regime has also mobilized several ethnonations against the Oromo people and their movement. 
There are also anti-Oromo forces such as Amhara colonial organizations and others who use any 
opportunity to undermine the interest of the Oromo nation. The constraints of the Oromo 
struggle are not limited to these problems. The Oromo national movement did not yet secure 
adequate sympathy and support for the Oromo cause from the international community. 
 It is very clear that the Tigrayan-led government and its agents terrorize and rule the 
Oromo not because of their strengths but because of the weaknesses of the Oromo movement, 
political leadership, and Oromo society. If some elements of Oromo society are well organized 
under one structured organization and leadership, they can rebel and dismantle the Meles regime 
within a short period. The Tigrayan soldiers, cadres, and their agents can be easily dismantled in 
Oromia if substantial numbers of Oromos engage in self-defense and coordinated uprising. If the 
Oromo people intensify their struggle, the international community will recognize the political 
problem of the Oromo nation. The Oromo people will achieve their national self-determination 
by intensifying their national struggle by any means necessary and by receiving international 
recognition.   
 The crisis of the Ethiopian Empire that started in the early 1970s still continues. The 
popular uprisings of ethnonations, classes, and social groups challenged the collapsing Ethiopian 
state for several decades and introduced some changes. These uprisings resulted in the 
overthrowing of the Haile Selassie and Mengistu regimes and caused the emergence of the Meles 
government and Tigrayan ethnocracy. But these changes failed to change the nature of Ethiopian 
colonialism. Ethiopia is still ruled by an authoritarian-terrorist government that practices colonial 
terrorism and clandestine genocide on the colonized peoples such as the Oromo, Somali, Sidama, 
Annuak and others. The Tigrayan-led regime that emerged in 1991 has intensified the crisis of 
the Ethiopian state and created the conditions that will give a death-below for this state. We 
know that the Oromo nation lost its political opportunities in the 1970s and the 1990s and 
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remained politically insignificant force. Are the Oromo political leadership, organizations, and 
society ready to utilize the emerging political crisis that will emerge on the grave of the Meles 
government?  
 Learning from the past experiences of the Ethiopian state, we can understand that the 
Meles regime has already dug its own grave. This regime is already rotten from inside, and it 
only survives because of the weaknesses of different political forces in the empire and financial 
and diplomatic support it receive form powerful countries. What will happen if the Meles regime 
collapses for whatever reason? Are the Oromo liberation fronts and political organizations ready 
to use this political opportunity? Oromo nationalists, liberation fronts, political organizations, 
community organizations and associations should start a serious national political dialogue to 
overcome their political naiveté and immaturity in order to build a national political consensus 
that will enable them to capture state power in Oromia by any means necessary and to build 
multinational democracy with other nations that accept the principles of self-determination and 
democracy. While preparing themselves to use any available political opportunity, the Oromo 
national movement and society must start to fashion a national Gumii Gayyo to produce a 
designed political results. These designed political results can be produced through 
determination, hard work, sacrifice, and a collective effort of all Oromo liberation fronts, 
political organizations, and associations. 
 
	   What is the Future of the Oromo People? 
The future of the Oromo people depends on what the Oromo liberation and political 
organizations and society will do to assure the survivability of the Oromo nation and its 
liberation from Ethiopian colonialism. The Oromo people have achieved what I have mentioned 
above by the determination and sacrifices of a few nationalist Oromos. Had millions of Oromos 
practically contributed their fare shares to the Oromo national movement, the level of the Oromo 
struggle would have been on the highest level or Oromia would have achieved its liberation. 
Furthermore, there are still millions of mercenary Oromos who are bleeding their nation by 
serving the enemies of the Oromo people. As I have already mentioned, some Oromo elites have 
promoted clan, regional or religious politics.  
 Currently, the mercenary Oromo elites promote the Tigrayan colonial objectives by 
joining the Ethiopian military, the so-called parliament and government, educational, and 
business institutions. Numerically Oromo mercenaries are the majority in the rubber-stamp 
parliament and the regional government of Oromia; they endorse the so-called laws of the Meles 
regime to enrich the Tigrayn region, Tigrayan elites and their domestic and international 
collaborators. These mercenaries participate in the criminal activities of the Meles government 
by taking marching order from their Tigrayan colonial masters. There are also Oromo 
mercenaries in churches and mosques who use the name of God, but engage in domesticating the 
minds of the Oromo to be subservient for their enemies. History demonstrates that churches and 
mosques play important roles in defending the victimized people and encouraging them to be 
united and struggle for their liberation. Several indigenous peoples around the world were 
decimated mainly because their enemies divided and turned them against one another. The 
colonized nations that could not defeat their traitors could not win their national victories.  
 If the politically consciousness Oromos start to fully contribute to the consolidation of the 
Oromo national movement through building the more structured organization and leadership, the 
Oromo nation will achieve its political victory. But, if the development Oromummaa is stagnated 
by the fragmentation and the political immaturity of its elites, the survival of the Oromo nation is 
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going to be in doubt. All Habasha elites want to destroy the Oromo national movement and its 
independent leadership by any means necessary. So they hate the OLF and attempt to destroy 
this organization and erase its name from the minds of the Oromo people. The Meles regime 
spends its full energy, money, and intellectual power in dividing the Oromo and turning them 
against their national struggle. The Tigrayan elites and their collaborators make an endless effort 
to make the Oromo people leaderless so that they can own Oromia and exploit its resources. 
 Colonialist committed genocide on indigenous people to expropriate their countries and 
resources in different parts of the world. Indigenous Americans and Australians and others were 
destroyed by the mechanisms of divide and conquer, state terrorism and genocide and replaced 
by the European settlers and their descendants. In the racialized capitalist world system might is 
right. The international system is a toothless tiger and it cannot effectively defend peoples like 
the Oromo who do not have state power. To overcome Tigrayan ethno-fascism and clandestine 
genocide, the Oromo elites must overcome their political ignorance and immaturity and 
consolidate the Oromo national movement into one structured organization and leadership in 
order to mobilize and organize the nation to prepare it for an inevitable confrontation with the 
enemy. 
 The future of the Oromo people will be decided by farsighted Oromo nationalists who 
can take practical political actions both in Oromia and the Diaspora to defeat both the internal 
and external enemies of the Oromo nation. Otherwise, the systematic destruction of the Oromo 
people will continue in order to transfer Oromian lands and natural resources to Tigrayan-led 
colonial settlers and their supporters. The Meles regime is attempting to give a final solution to 
the Oromo question. It is up to the Oromo elites and people to stop this terrorist regime and to 
determine their destiny as a nation. Those Oromos who believe in the existence of a free Oromia 
must engage in self-defense by any means necessary in their country. Specifically building the 
Oromo Liberation Army and Oromo self-defense forces is the priority of the day.  
 The Oromo Liberation Army and self-defense forces will lay the foundation of a 
sovereign Oromia state that can establish a multinational democracy with other interested 
peoples. The Diaspora Oromos must make adequate financial, intellectual and other 
contributions to enable the victimized Oromos to defend themselves. Overall, Oromo nationalists 
must start to reassess the tactics and strategies of their national struggle both in Oromia in the 
Diaspora to engage in practical organizational, ideological, and diplomatic actions. 
Unfortunately, those Oromos who are neutral and passive are indirectly contributing to the 
demise of the Oromo people. The future of the Oromo people is not predetermined; those 
committed Oromos who can take concrete liberation actions with whatever they can decide it.  
 When Oromo mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, and heroines and heroes are 
massacred in their villages and/or languish in Ethiopian prisons; when Oromo girls and women 
are violated and raped in their homes and communities and concentration camps; when Oromo 
fertile lands, minerals, and natural resources are expropriated and transferred to colonial forces 
and their international supporters; when the Oromo people are perishing by absolute poverty, 
recurrent famines, malnutrition, and diseases, how can we be sure about the survival of the 
Oromo nation? All Oromo elites who are in the nationalist camp, who are mercenaries, and 
neutrals must realize that the Ethiopian “colonial school system educated [them to be] fools and 
clowns, fascinated by the ideas and way of life” of their colonial masters. So they must be ready 
to reevaluate their education, knowledge, and ideology in order to confront the challenges that 
are facing their people. If the Oromo elites continue to be “fools and clowns” of the Amhara-
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Tigrayan elites, they first allow the destruction of the Oromo nation and then the destruction of 
themselves. The Oromo elites cannot survive without the Oromo nation.  
 So what should the Oromo Diaspora in general the elites in particular should do to make 
sure the survival of their nation and the victory of their national struggle? History demonstrates 
that the determined people can liberate themselves. The Oromo elites in general and that of the 
Diaspora in particular must start to determine the destiny of their nation by taking the following 
concrete steps immediately. First, In the Diaspora, they must initiate town hall meetings in every 
town where the Oromo community live and discuss about the fate of the Oromo people by 
focusing in their achievements, failures, challenges, and constraints as a nation. In the Ethiopian 
Empire, the Oromo people are denied the freedom of self-expression, organization, and the 
media.  Second, the Oromo in the Diaspora must stop the politics of self-destruction by avoiding 
engaging in clan, religious, and regional politics, and by isolating the Oromo mercenaries from 
every Oromo community.  
 Since the Oromo mercenaries use clan, religious, and regional politics to divide the 
Oromo people and turn them against one another, the Oromo community must reject them and 
their politics. The Oromo community must ostracize them by not relating to them and by 
refusing to participate on their social events such as death and marriage. Every Oromo 
community must identify, expose, and expel the Oromo mercenaries from their networks, 
churches, mosques, associations, and other social worlds. Third, the Oromo Diaspora must 
challenge the Oromo activists who have built their separate organizations in order to break down 
barriers among different Oromo organizations and unite them under one structured organization 
and leadership. Fourth, Oromo youth and women should be mobilized in order to actively 
participate in national dialogues and town hall meetings; they must play a leading role since they 
are less corrupted by the ideologies of egoism, clan, religious and regional politics.  
 Fifth, Oromo nationalists must establish the rule law fashioning on the principles of gada 
and other democratic traditions to use it in running their national affairs. Sixth, since unconscious 
people cannot liberate themselves from colonial domination, the Oromo Diaspora should receive 
liberation knowledge through regular dialogues, seminars, conferences, workshops, lectures, and 
study circles. The Oromo must learn their history, culture, language, and traditions; they also 
need to learn about the world around them. At this historical moment, the number one enemy of 
the Oromo people is political ignorance; Oromo nationalist must smash this enemy. When this is 
accomplished, the Oromo people are going to play their historical role that will commensurate 
with their number. When this sleeping giant nation will be awakened, others cannot use the 
Oromos as raw materials. One of the main reasons why forty million Oromos are terrorized and 
ruled by the elites that emerged from five million Tigrayans is lack political consciousness.  
 Seventh, every self-respecting Oromo must realize that he or she has power to determine 
the destiny of Oromia. Every Oromo must be educated about his or her potential power and what 
he or she must do to translate it to real power. Eighth, the Oromo Diaspora movement must start 
building from bottom-up a confederation of Oromo political, religious, community, and self-help 
organizations to create a Global Gumii Gayyo of Oromia that will contribute ideological, 
organizational, and financial resources for consolidating the Oromo struggle and the Oromo 
Liberation Army and self-defense militias in Oromia.  
 Ninth, all members of the Oromo Diaspora must engage in public diplomacy by 
becoming members of organizations such as the Orom-American Citizens Council. Tenth, 
Oromo nationalists in the Diaspora must start to build a well-regulated system that can provide 
support and security for Oromos who are determined to advance the Oromo national interest 
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whenever they face hardship beyond their control. Finally, the Oromo must believe that they will 
liberate themselves by any means necessary. There is no any doubt that, despite hardships and 
sacrifices, the Oromo “social volcano” that is being fermented will soon burn down Ethiopian 
colonial structures that perpetuate terrorism, genocide, disease, absolute poverty, and 
malnutrition in Oromia and beyond.   
  
